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INTRODUCTION

The national increase in reporting of suspected child abuse' has put
pressure on states to find safe and affordable shelters for children,
particularly during the early stages of the investigation. 2 One response to

*

Assistant Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania

State University. I am particularly grateful for the hard work and inspiration of our students
and staff attorneys in the Family Law Clinic at The Dickinson School of Law.
1. See NATIONAL CTR. ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 1994: REPORTS FROM THE STATES TO THE
NATIONAL CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT at ix (1996) ("The number of children

[nationally] who were the subjects of reports of alleged maltreatment increased from 2.6
million in 1990 to 2.9 million in 1994.").
2. The increase in reporting of suspected abuse is not, however, a reliable indicator
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this challenge has been for state authorities to suggest a so-called voluntary
agreement. The investigating agency approaches the parents, one or both of
whom may be suspected of abuse, with a superficially benign proposal that
the suspect separate from the child during the pendency of the investigation.
The voluntary label is often misleading when applied to such
agreements. The agency usually insists that the parents make an immediate
decision, and may use tactics or threats that can be characterized as
"blatantly coercive."4 In addition, the agency may fail to give the often
frightened and unsophisticated parents the information they need to
understand the serious consequences of such an emergency decision.5
Unfortunately, such agreements are sometimes treated as routine, voluntary
waivers of parental rights.
In this article, I begin with background about the practical and due
process implications of voluntary separation or placement agreements.6
Following the background section, I outline a typical statutory framework
for emergency removal or separation of the child and parent.7 Next, I
compare the way a voluntary separation agreement may result in
circumvention, whether or not intentional, of the protections provided by
such statutes. In particular, I explain how these agreements may negatively
impact an innocent parent's ability to defend herself.8 Next, I review Croft
of an increase in the existence of abuse. In Pennsylvania, for example, for the three year
period of 1983, 1984, and 1985, an average of 18,982 suspected child abuse reports were
made yearly to state and county authorities. See PENNSYLVANIA DEP'T OF PUB. WELFARE,
1995 CHILD ABUSE REPORT 7-8 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 PA. REPORT]. Ten years later, the
three-year average was 24,246, representing a 28% increase in the reporting of incidents. Id.
However, by comparison, the three-year average for "substantiated" reports rose from 6,925
(1983-1985) to only 7,248 (1993-1995), an overall increase in substantiated reports of 5%,
but a decrease of 17% in the ratio of substantiated reports to total reports of child abuse. Id.
3. E.g., Croft v. Westmoreland County Children & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123,
1124 (3d Cir. 1997); Gottlieb v. County of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 515 (2d Cir. 1996).
4. See Croft, 103 F.3d at 1125 n.I; see also Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534
(1963) (holding that a defendant's confession was involuntary when "made only after the
police had told her that state financial aid for her infant children would be cut off, and her
children taken from her, if she did not 'cooperate'); United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332,
1336 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that a defendant's confession was involuntary: "When law
enforcement officers deliberately prey upon the maternal instinct and inculcate fear in a
mother that she will not see her child in order to elicit 'cooperation,' they exert the 'improper
influence' proscribed by [prior case law] .... Viewed in that light, [the officer's] statements
were patently coercive.").
5. See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534 (listing the following factors as contributing to a
finding of involuntary confession: "There was no friend or adviser to whom she might turn.
She had had no previous experience with the criminal law, and had no reason not to believe
that the police had ample power to carry out their threats.").
6. See discussion infra Part II.
7. See discussion infra Part II1.
8. See discussion infra Part III. I use Pennsylvania as a model for this examination
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v. Westmoreland County Children & Youth Services,9 a recent, important
civil rights decision from the Third Circuit.' ° This decision condemns the
voluntary label, thus opening the door to recovery of damages from the
social worker because of violations of the parents' rights to substantive and
procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
This article also examines the criteria used by courts to address
voluntariness concerns in analogous contexts and proposes a model for
review of this issue in child welfare proceedings. " When parents claim they
were forced to separate from the child during an investigation, I propose that
courts should provide them with standards and an opportunity for an
effective hearing to resolve the voluntariness issues.' 2
Finally, this article concludes that legislative changes are necessary to
facilitate temporary separations and placements that better address the needs
of the whole family. 13 I urge states to mandate the use of written temporary
placement plans and to provide indigent parents with counsel before asking
them to make an emergency decision.' 4 At a minimum, agencies should be
required to give parents specific information necessary for them to make an
informed choice.
II. BACKGROUND

Careful examination of the pressures the state imposes upon parents to
enter into a separation agreement reveals the often fictional nature of the
voluntary label and the consequent need for concern. As early as 1977, the
Supreme Court noted an already long-standing complaint that states were
using fictional voluntary agreements to avoid statutory process: "The extent
to which supposedly 'voluntary' placements are in fact voluntary has been
questioned .... For example, it has been said that many 'voluntary'
placements are in fact coerced by threat of neglect proceedings and are not
in fact voluntary in the sense of the product of an informed consent."' 5
Despite the passage of twenty years since the Supreme Court's
comment, the need for concern about voluntary agreements has only grown
stronger, particularly when used during investigations. These agreements

for two reasons: (I) Pennsylvania follows the Model Juvenile Act; and (2) the manner in
which Pennsylvania authorities have obtained voluntary placements from parents raises
concerns about coercion and serious disruption of the family.
9. 103 F.3d 1123 (3d Cir. 1997).
10. Id.; see discussion infra Part IV.
11. See discussion infra Part V.
12. See discussion infra Part V.D.
13. See discussion infra Part VI.
14. Id.
15. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 834
(1977) (dictum) (footnote omitted).
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hide under various "voluntary" labels, including "voluntary" or "consensual"
placements, separations, removals or relinquishments, and. care must be
taken to examine their true nature. Case histories demonstrate that
throughout the country parents feel unduly pressured by well-meaning,
although perhaps overzealous, social workers to enter into voluntary
agreements, which have serious, but poorly explained, consequences.16

16. Several cases reveal parents' concerns arising out of pressure-ridden agreements.
In Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Services, Inc., 85 F.3d 1365 (8th Cir. 1996), the agency
removed the child from the mother's home during an investigation of child abuse. Id. at
1369. The County claimed that the mother "voluntarily consented" to the removal as its
initial defense in a subsequent civil rights suit. Id. at 1369 n.2. The court refused to
consider the voluntary consent defense: "We hold that defendants have not established
beyond genuine dispute that [the mother] voluntarily consented to the removal of [the child]
from plaintiffs' home. If anything, the evidence indicates that [the case worker] never gave
[the mother] a choice in the matter." Id. The court held, however, that the mother's due
process rights were not violated because other facts established reasonable suspicion
justifying emergency removal of the child. Id. at 1371-73.
In Gottlieb v. County of Orange, 84 F.3d 511 (2d Cir. 1996), during a protracted
investigation, the social worker informed the parents that "the County would seek to take [the
children] into custody ... unless [the mother] could make suitable arrangements to separate
[R]ather than have the children moved or removed, [the
the children from [the father] ....
father] left the home." Id. at 515. The court found no due process violation since the father
could have initiated his own hearing or notified the County of his intention to return home,
thus forcing the County to seek a court order. Id. at 522.
In Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437 (8th Cir. 1987), parents raised various complaints
about the procedures used in Minnesota to separate children from possible abusers during the
investigation following a six-month inquiry into allegations of child sexual abuse. For
example, the mother of one child "signed a document authorizing voluntary placement ...
in foster care. However, she state[d] that she was pressured and misled into signing the
agreement." Id. at 1443. The court held that the action of obtaining the mother's signature
was "shielded by qualified immunity from further litigation." Id. at 1463 n.21.
In Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 822-23 (2d Cir. 1977), a representative of the
Bureau of Child Welfare visited a mother in the hospital where the mother was receiving
treatment for emotional problems. The representative "attempted to have her sign a form
granting consent to the Bureau to obtain custody." Id. at 822. Despite assurances that "she
would not lose any rights as mother" and that she could have the children back when she was
out of the hospital, the mother "refused to sign." Id. The agency proceeded to hold the
children without seeking judicial approval. Id. at 823. The court held that the failure of the
agency to "obtain judicial ratification of their decision to maintain custody of the children,
despite the numerous and vociferous requests of [the mother] for their return, constituted a
violation of due process." Id. at 828.
In Dietz v. Damas, 932 F. Supp. 431 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), the City claimed that "it was
agreed by everyone that [the child] would be released to the [grandparents], and that the
parents could stay with [the child], subject to the grandparents' supervision." Id. at 437.
However, the mother claimed that "the arrangement ... was arranged 'out of desperation,'
at the suggestion of her father, because '[the social worker] told [her] that the baby was not
going to be released to [the parent's] care."' Id. The court held that short-term, informal
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Regardless of the label used by the particular jurisdiction, the separation
often occurs in one of two ways: (1) the agency tells the parent who is
suspected of being an abuser to leave the home; 7 or (2) the agency tells the
parents to place the child in the home of another family member for the
duration of the investigation." This voluntary separation is attractive to
agencies, and perhaps, to the average taxpayer, because on the surface it
appears to be a no-cost alternative to state-financed emergency shelter or
foster care.' 9 Indeed, at first it may seem less threatening to the parents than
the imagined horrors of bureaucratic care. 20 However, when the parents later
seek reunification of the family, they are often confronted with the

placement of the child with the grandparents, which did not put unreasonable restrictions on
the parents' access to the child over Christmas holidays, did not rise to the level of
constitutional deprivation. Id. at 448.
Compare, however, Greenberg v. Kmetko, 811 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1987), where an
Illinois social worker's successful suit for constructive discharge was based, in part, on an
allegation that he was improperly disciplined for failing to comply with agency policy to
force parents to sign a voluntary placement agreement. Id. at 1071-72.
17. See, e.g., Gottlieb, 84 F.3d at 515.
18. See, e.g., Croft v. Westmoreland County Children & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d
1123, 1126 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997) (concluding that for purposes of testing the voluntariness of
the parent's decision, there is no distinction between the forms of separation).
19. Informal separation agreements may, however, involve a lack of sufficient
safeguards for the child, thus altering the true "cost" calculation. For example, the substitute
family member may be "chosen" without any investigation, and may prove to be an
inadequate or even dangerous caretaker. The substitute may also be unable or unwilling to
monitor the suspect parent's contacts with the child. For example, in Powell v. Georgia
Department of Human Resources, 114 F.3d 1074 (11th Cir. 1997), the social worker
instructed the maternal grandmother not to allow the suspected mother to have custody of
the child during the ongoing investigation; however, within a few days, the child was
"returned to the mother's home." Id. at 1076. The child died within two weeks of blunt
head trauma, and the mother and stepfather were later convicted of the baby's murder. Id.
at 1076-77. The court held that the social worker's decision could not be the basis for a
substantive due process claim. Id. at 1080. For another example, see Estate of Bailey v.
County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 510-11 (3d Cir. 1985) (permitting civil rights claim by father
based on allegation that child was returned to mother without adequate investigation of
mother and boyfriend).
20. Even without an explicit threat, the atmosphere in which the investigation begins
is often intimidating for the parents, particularly if they are poor, uneducated or have been
the focus of government inquiry in the past. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families
for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 834 (1977) ("The poor have little choice but to submit
to state supervised child care when family crises strike."); see also Richardson v. City of
Philadelphia, No. CIV.A.89-8901, 1992 WL 46899, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 1992) (finding
a reviewable issue of fact on whether the mother's consent was voluntary where the mother
was considered "slow"), aff'd, 977 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1992); In re S.A.D., 555 A.2d 123, 12425 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (stating that the mother "had no money and no place to stay").
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surprisingly
serious and adverse consequences of their initial separation
21
decision.
Too often, the emergency separation decision is accomplished
informally, without a written document, and is treated by the state as 22a
waiver or delay of the usual child welfare or dependency process,
including a waiver or delay of the following:
*

23
the parents' right to counsel;

*

the parents' right to have prompt judicial review of the reasons for

*

the parents'
right to prompt planning for reunification of the child with
25

separation; 24 and
the family.

21. For example, in In re C.R.S., 696 A.2d 840 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997), the parents'
separation from their child began with a request from a caseworker after thirty days of
investigation had passed. Id. at 842. After being told their only choice was voluntary
separation or immediate removal of the child by the agency and placement in foster care, the
parents reluctantly agreed to an informal placement of the child with paternal grandparents
with whom they did not have a good relationship. Brief for Appellant at 35-40, In re C.R.S.
(Nos. 96-00409, 96-00410). The agency eventually filed a dependency action against the
parents more than sixty days after the commencement of the investigation. In re C.R.S., No.
95-0601, at 3-6 (Pa. Ct. C.P., Juv. Ct. Div. Jul. 23, 1996). Thus, more than thirty days of
voluntary separation was followed by several additional months of court-ordered continuance
of the grandparent custody. Id. Eventually, on appeal, the parents were able to obtain a
reversal on the merits of the lower court's findings of abuse and dependency. In re C.R.S.,
696 A.2d at 846.
22. See, e.g., In re S.A.D., 555 A.2d at 125 (noting the failure of the agency to
submit a copy of the purported voluntary placement agreement but taking the position that
the mother had surrendered a "fundamental constitutional right" in the agreement).
23. E.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6337 (West 1982) (stating that in proceedings
under the Juvenile Act, which includes dependency proceedings, "a party is entitled to
representation by legal counsel at all stages of any proceedings . .. and if he is without
financial resources or otherwise unable to employ counsel, to have the court provide counsel
for him").
24. E.g., id. § 6332(a) (West Supp. 1998).
An informal hearing shall be held promptly by the court or master and not later than 72
hours after the child is placed in detention or shelter care to determine whether his
detention or shelter care is required .... If the child is alleged to be a dependent child,
the court or master shall also determine whether reasonable efforts were made to prevent
such placement or, in the case of an emergency placement where services were not
offered and could not have prevented the necessity of placement, whether such lack of
efforts was reasonable.
Id.
25. See 55 PA. CODE § 3130.61(b) (1998) ("The service plan ... shall include ...
[t]he service objectives for the family, identifying changes needed to protect children in the
family in need of protection from abuse, neglect and exploitation and to prevent their
placement.").
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Further, states have argued that the parents made their decision
voluntarily, and that the caretaker was not a state agent.26 Therefore, the
separation did not involve protective custody or other reviewable state
action.27 Nonetheless, the state's insistence on separation may continue for
a few days, a few weeks, or, as occurred in one case, for more that a year,
all without independent review of the agency's reasons for separation. 28 The
voluntary agreement circumvents the traditional requirement of a prompt
hearing and opportunity for the defendants to present their facts, an
opportunity that is contemplated by most child welfare statutes and
fundamental concepts of due process.29 Without careful restrictions on the
way agencies may use such agreements, the risk of misuse by harried state
authorities exists.
When government agencies seek separation agreements during the
investigation of child abuse, the voluntariness issue noted by the Supreme
Court in 1977 involves two distinct, but sometimes overlapping, concerns
about the actions of the authorities.3 ° First, there is a question as to whether
social workers are providing necessary information to the parents before
asking them to separate from their child.3 Despite the existence of

26. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S.
189 (1989), where the Court held that the Due Process Clause did not create a substantive
right against the investigating government agency where the child was harmed by the father
while in the father's custody. Id. at 200. The Court distinguished the circumstances in this
case from one in which the child was in the custody of a state agency. Id. Relying on the
decision in DeShaney, the court in Weller v. Department of Social Services, 901 F.2d 387
(4th Cir. 1990), stated,
Although [the plaintiff] attempts to distinguish DeShaney on the ground that [the state
agency] created the situation ... by transferring custody to his grandmother and then
to [the child's] mother, we agree . . . that DeShaney is applicable to the extent that
Maryland had no duty to provide [the child] with protective services.
Id. at 392.
27. See, e.g., Croft v. Westmoreland County Children & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d
1123, 1124-25 (3d Cir. 1997) (child not taken into custody).
28. Lindsey v. Warren County Children & Youth Servs., No. 93-267 (W.D. Pa. Mar.
31, 1996) (affirming, without opinion, the decision of the district court in favor of the
defendant social workers) (copies of pleadings, orders, and briefs in possession of author).
29. See, e.g., Caroll J. Miller, Annotation, Validity and Application of Statute
Allowing Endangered Child to be Temporarily Removed from Parental Custody, 38
A.L.R.4TH 756 (1985) (analyzing cases that interpret statutes addressing removal of children
from parents); Monrad G. Paulsen, The Legal Frameworkfor Child Protection, 66 COLUM.
L. REv. 679 (1966) (analyzing methods of child protection).
30. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
834 (1977).
31. E.g., In re J.H., 480 So. 2d 680, 683 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) ("[The mother]
stated she eventually signed [a partially blank] agreement 'because they said if I didn't sign
it they was [sic] going to tell the judge.').
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procedures in many states that govern the use of specific, written voluntary
placement plans that spell out at least some of the parents' rights and
alternatives," authorities may engage in a far more questionable practice of
seeking oral, informal agreements.33
At a minimum, such informality contributes to parents making
uninformed or ill-considered decisions.34 The informality is often an open
invitation for unhealthy disputes, both about what authorities said to
persuade the parents to enter into the voluntary agreement, and about the
actual terms of the agreement.35 This informal practice increases the
opportunities for manipulation of the parents, perhaps motivated by the
authorities' desire to be seen as taking swift action to "do something" about
the possibility of abuse.36
Second, authorities sometimes employ coercive tactics. The agency may
phrase the parents' choice in express or implicit terms of "do it our way or
else., 3' Agencies may use the availability of judicial process as a threat
rather than as a safeguard, as in "'[y]ou are going to go my way or I'll force

32. See, e.g., 55 PA. CODE § 3130.65 (1998); cf Pfoltzer v. County of Fairfax, 775
F. Supp. 874, 881 (E.D. Va. 1991) (describing clear waivers obtained through use of a
written consent order setting forth the parent's agreement to services).
33. See Croft v. Westmoreland County Children & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123,
1125 (3d Cir. 1997).
34. See, e.g., In re C.R.S., 696 A.2d 840, 842 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
35. See Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Servs., Inc., 85 F.3d 1365, 1369 n.2 (8th Cir.
1996) (identifying factual dispute about voluntary consent to separation); see also Gardiner
v. Incorporated Village, 50 F.3d 151, 157 (2d Cir. 1995) (Oakes, J., dissenting) (discussing
factual nature of dispute over consent to interview child).
36. E.g., Richard D. Krugman, M.D., Universal Home Visiting: A Recommendation
from the US. Advisory Board on Child Abuse and Neglect, 3 FUTURE OF CHILDREN (U.
Colo. School of Medicine) No. 3, 184-85 (Winter 1993) ("The sense of urgency felt by the
[U.S. Advisory Board] was further heightened by news stories in 1988 that provoked a public
outcry to 'do something' about child abuse .... "); see also Joe Sexton, As Courts Remove
Children, Lawyers for Parents Stumble, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1996, at Al. "The purely
statistical need for legal help for parents has rarely been more acute ....
[New York City]
Child-welfare officials are removing children from households at a rate nearly double that
of a year ago." Id. at B8. "[C]aseworkers say they sometimes remove children from
households to protect themselves from public second-guessing." Id. at Al, B8.
37. See Faulkner v. Reeves, No. CIV.A.91-1880, 1992 WL 96286, at *9 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 23, 1992) (finding a valid, substantive due process claim with allegation that a social
worker forced a family to agree to undergo private counseling on abuse issues); see also
Croft, 103 F.3d at 1124-25; cf Hurlman v. Rice, 927 F.2d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1991) (reversing
summary judgment motion against a defendant where conflicting evidence included plaintiff's
testimony that a state trooper threatened arrest if the child was not handed over to the father
in a child custody dispute). But see King v. Olmstead Co., 117 F.3d 1065, 1067 (8th Cir.
1997) (holding that "mere verbal threats" to "take" the two younger sons if parents did not
"cooperate" with a foster care plan for oldest son did not constitute actionable constitutional
violation).
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you to go to court and you will go that way! "'3 The intimidating presence
of a police officer reinforces the threat.3 In one instance, the officer who
accompanied the social worker admitted making a threat to arrest the
mother, not because of any allegation or proof that she was an abuser, but
because he viewed her conduct during the interview as "disorderly."4 ° After
the officer's statement, the mother complied with the social worker's
demands." While such an approach creates an interesting dilemma around
which to plot a book or movie, drawing comparisons to The Godfather,42
such tactics are irresponsible, particularly if countenanced by the state as an
avoidance of procedural safeguards for the handling of child abuse
investigations.
As presented here, the fiction behind many voluntary placement or
separation agreements is another reminder of the need for caution when
giving police powers to even the best-intentioned public servant. As one
commentator on child welfare cases has noted,
A danger exists in child protection [proceedings] that the personal rights
of parents and children will not be protected in our well-intentioned zeal
to protect and help children and parents. Our good intentions do not alter
the need to recognize and respect the personal integrity and autonomy of
clients. Mr. Justice Brandeis warned us about the dangers to our liberty
presented by the benevolently intended state:
"Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are
naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The
greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal,
'
well-meaning but without understanding."43

Justice Brandeis's warning is appropriate in this context. For example, a
review of recent federal civil rights suits" filed in Pennsylvania reveals a
38. Faulkner, 1992 WL 96286, at *9.
39. See Croft v. Westmoreland County Children & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123,
1124 (3d Cir. 1997) (officer accompanied social worker).
40. Brief for Appellants at 7, Lindsey v. Warren County Children & Youth Servs.,
149 F.3d 1164 (3d Cir. 1998) (No. 96-3734) (copy in possession of author).
41. Id.
42. "I'll make him an offer he can't refuse." MARIO Puzo, THE GODFATHER 37
(1969).
43. Donald N. Duquette, Liberty and Lawyers in ChildProtection,in THE BATTERED
CHILD 401, 402 (Ray E. Heifer & Ruth S. Kempe eds., 4th ed. 1987) (quoting Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
44. The suits were filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violation of the parents'
constitutional rights as a consequence of the initial removal of their child or a parent from
the family home at the insistence of state authorities. See cases cited infra note 45. This is
a distinct claim from any challenge to the procedural mechanisms by which states have
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recurrent concern about the tactics used by various counties' agencies to
obtain voluntary placement decisions during the investigation stages.4 5

III. A

CLOSE LOOK AT THE QUESTIONABLE VOLUNTARY SEPARATION
DECISION: THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR ABUSE INVESTIGATIONS

The governmental role in child abuse investigations is frequently
precipitated by a written report or a phone call, often anonymous, to a
county agency or a state's child abuse hotline.' The agency then dispatches

permitted emergency removal actions. See Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 336 (4th Cir.
1994) (upholding state statute but permitting challenge to removal action). For a partial
history of other actions challenging child protective services laws in federal courts, see
Martin Guggenheim, State Intervention in the Family: Making a Federal Case Out of It, 45
OHIO ST. L.J. 399 (1984).
45. See Richardson v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIV.A.89-8901, 1992 WL 46899, at
*6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 1992) ("[T]he question before the Court is whether plaintiff has
produced sufficient evidence that, although she signed a voluntary placement agreement
putting Michael in foster care, her decision was, in fact, involuntary."); see also Faulkner v.
Reeves, No. CIV.A.91-1880, 1992 WL 96286, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 1992) ("Plaintiffs
contend.., that defendant.., threatened to take [the child] away from them if they did not
comply with their investigation."); Rinderer v. Delaware County Children & Youth Servs.,
703 F. Supp. 358, 361 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding that threats by social workers caused wife
to remove children from home and husband did not state cause of action against social
worker for violation of wife's constitutional rights because wife was never separated from
children; however, complaint did state cause of action on behalf of husband); cf Lindsey,
No. 93-267 Erie (order denying prospective class action certification asserting a county-wide
practice of coerced, unwritten voluntary separations). After the court granted partial
summary judgment to the defendants on several issues, the Lindsey parents were permitted
to proceed on their procedural due process claim that the social worker failed to advise the
parents that consent to informal adjustment was not obligatory, resulting in many months of
forced separation of father and children without judicial review. Id. Following a non-jury
trial in November of 1996 and a decision upholding the actions of the social workers, the
parents filed an appeal in the Third Circuit. See Lindsey v. Warren County Children &
Youth Servs., 149 F.3d 1164 (3d Cir. 1998) (No. 96-3734) (affirming, without opinion, the
decision of the district court in favor of the defendant social workers).
46. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is authorized by the
Social Security Act to cooperate with state agencies in the creation and support of child
welfare services and foster care. 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-628, 670-679a (1994). To obtain federal
funding, states must develop a plan for such services. See id. §§ 622, 671; 45 C.F.R. §§
1355.21, 1356.30, 1357.15, 1357.20, 1357.25 (1997). In Pennsylvania, for example, an
allegation of abuse involves processes governed by two separate statutes, the Child Protective
Services Law, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6301-6384 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998), and the
Juvenile Act, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6301-6365 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998). The
Child Protective Services Law is a reporting statute, designed to facilitate identification,
investigation, emergency protection and record-keeping of child abuse. 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 6301-6384. State custody over the child is governed by the Juvenile Act. 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6301-6345. The two statutes should be construed together to
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its child protective services caseworker or investigator to make prompt
contact with the reporting party and the family, usually within twenty-four
hours of the first report.47 When a parent is the suspect of the child abuse
report, the investigation will include an early questioning of the parent,
frequently without advance notice and without the presence of counsel."
Although a minority of states recognize that a suspected parent has a right
to counsel during early stages of an investigation,49 the caseworker typically
insists on an immediate interview while providing the suspected parent with
fairly minimal information, such as an oral summary of the anonymous
report and description of any appeal rights."
When making the first contact, the caseworker usually proceeds to the
suspect parent's house accompanied by a law enforcement officer, who may
have the power to make a warrantless removal of the child from the home."
The parent may be subjected to intense "interviews" and multiple
examinations, including questioning by several caseworkers or supervisors,
the law enforcement official, or medical personnel.5 2 Inconsistencies in the

determine the complete procedural framework for handling a parental abuse allegation. See
In meJ.R.W., 631 A.2d 1019, 1021-22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); In re R.M.R., 530 A.2d 1381,
1383 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
47. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6368(a). The Pennsylvania Child Protective
Services Law makes a distinction between "general" protective services for "non-abuse"
cases and higher priority protective services and investigation time limits for "child abuse"
investigations. See, e.g., id. § 6303 (definitions).
48. See, e.g., Croft v. Westmoreland County Children & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d
1123, 1124 (3d Cir. 1997).
49. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-26 (Supp. 1997) (providing that a party's
entitlement to legal counsel exists during "custodial, post-petition, and informal adjustment
stages of proceedings"); see also In meR.W.B., 241 N.W.2d 546, 556 (N.D. 1976) (holding
that parents involved in proceedings for the termination of parental rights were entitled to
counsel before the initial interview with the investigating social service agency).
50. For example, in 1995, Pennsylvania's Cumberland County Children and Youth
Service Agency used a letter that in pertinent part provided,
Under the law, you have a right to obtain a copy of the reports filed which will exclude
any identifying information about the parties who made the report or cooperated in the
investigation. To obtain a copy of these reports, you must make a written request to the
Agency at the below-listed address. You also have the right within 45 days of being
notified of the status of the report to request of the Department of Public Welfare that
indicated reports be amended or expunged, and, if your request is denied or not acted
upon within 30 days, you have a right to a hearing on the matter. ...
Form Letter from Cumberland County Children & Youth Servs., Carlisle, Pa. (copy on file
with the author).
51. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6324(3) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998) ("A child
may be taken into custody ...[b]y a law enforcement officer or duly authorized officer of
the court if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child is suffering from illness or
injury or is in imminent danger from his surroundings, and that his removal is necessary.").
52. See, e.g., id. § 6339 (investigation and report procedures).
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parent's descriptions may be treated as "hallmark" signs of an abuser trying
to cover his or her tracks, rather than mere confusion or exhaustion with the
process.5 3 At this point, the caseworker may believe separation of the child
from the parent is the safest course, thus triggering the caseworker's desire
for a voluntary separation agreement as an alternative to a judicial
proceeding for an emergency removal. 4
During the investigation, if the law enforcement official believes he or
she has sufficient cause to suspect child abuse by a parent, the official may
make a warrantless emergency removal of the child and place the child in
a shelter for a short period of time; however, an application for prompt
judicial review must accompany this removal." The agency's caseworkers
may be required to seek a court order before removing the child from the
parent and to obtain a prompt hearing after removal. 6 Thus, some type of
judicial hearing, often an informal emergency or shelter hearing, is normally
required shortly after removal for the agency to establish facts that justify
continued state custody over the child. 7
Properly used, such judicial review serves as an important safeguard for
the child and the parents. 8 This informal hearing, such as Pennsylvania's
seventy-two hour protective custody hearing, 9 would often be the parents'
first opportunity to tell an independent reviewer (i.e., the court) his or her
explanation of the child's injury, and to hear a full explanation of his or her

53.
beholder.
103 F.3d
interviews

As with beauty, inconsistencies are judged subjectively by the eyes of the
See, e.g., In re C.R.S., 696 A.2d 840, 844 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); see also Croft,
at 1127 (describing caseworker's red flags as "statements given during the
which raised questions in her mind about whether the [anonymous] tip was true");

I JOHN E.B. MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT

§

3.9 (2d ed. 1992).

An implausible explanation is critically important for diagnostic purposes. In addition
to its medical value, implausible explanations may indicate consciousness of guilt, and
may be admitted under that theory....
An abusive caretaker who invents an explanation for a child's injuries may have
difficulty keeping the story straight. When the explanation differs each time the
caretaker describes what happened, suspicion arises.
Id. at 155-56.
54. See, e.g., Croft, 103 F.3d at 1125.
55. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6324(3).
56. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6369; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6324(1).
57. E.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6332(a).
58. Recently, the alleged failure of one state to enforce its statutory requirements for
prompt judicial review of child removals opened the door to a class action seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief against court officials. Pamela B. v. Ment, 709 A.2d 1089,
1100 (Conn. 1998) ("We have been properly forewarned of the well recognized harm to
children caused by delayed hearings ....
It is thus imperative that parents be given a prompt
and meaningful opportunity to challenge an order of temporary custody.").
59. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6315(a); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6332(a).
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rights in subsequent proceedings.6" The informal hearing, in turn, ordinarily
leads to a more formal evidentiary hearing, sometimes called a
"dependency" or "adjudication" hearing.6 The dependency hearing is often
the first 62time that an indigent parent will have access to the assistance of
counsel.

Statutes frequently call for the dependency hearing to occur within ten
days of the removal, unless the parent waives the time periods. 63 The
dependency hearing often imposes a fairly strict burden of proof on the state
seeking continued custody over the child, such as a requirement that the
agency prove by clear and convincing evidence' that the child has been
"abused ' 65' and that the child is presently without proper parental care.66
The state statutory framework for judicial supervision of child
separations for removals is an important response to constitutional due
process concerns. 67 As the Connecticut Supreme Court recently emphasized:
Courts and state agencies, therefore, must keep in mind the constitutional
limitations imposed on a state that undertakes any form of coercive
intervention in family affairs. Some of the same constraints have been
imposed upon the state by the legislature, recognizing the importance of
the prompt adjudication
of cases in which the state has interfered with the
68
family unit.

PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6332.
Id. § 6335(a).
See id.§ 6337.
See, e.g., PamelaB., 709 A.2d at 1104 (discussing the importance of a properly

60. See 42
61.
62.
63.

conducted "ten-day hearing").
64. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6341(c); In re C.R.S., 696 A.2d 840, 843 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1997).
65. Pennsylvania defines child abuse to include:

(i) Any recent act or failure to act by a perpetrator which causes nonaccidental serious
physical injury to a child under 18 years of age.

(ii) An act or failure to act by a perpetrator which causes nonaccidental serious mental
injury to or sexual abuse or sexual exploitation of a child under 18 years of age.
(iii) Any recent act, failure to act or series of such acts or failures to act by a perpetrator
which creates an imminent risk of serious physical injury to or sexual abuse or sexual
exploitation of a child under 18 years of age.
(iv) Serious physical neglect by a perpetrator constituting prolonged or repeated lack of
supervision or the failure to provide essentials of life, including adequate medical care,
which endangers a child's life or development or impairs the child's functioning.
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6303(b).
66. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6302 (defining "dependent child").
67. See, e.g., Lassiterv. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981); Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 318, 334-35 (1976).
68. Pamela B., 709 A.2d at 1098.
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If the parent, however, participates in some type of voluntary plan for
separation from the child, the agency may treat the parent's cooperation as
a voluntary waiver of the traditional statutory safeguards, including any
prompt judicial review or appointment of counsel. The consequences of the
voluntary participation can be dramatic, particularly if the parent's defense
to allegations of abuse requires a timely and sophisticated counterinvestigation.
For example, in one reported instance, a so-called voluntary separation
agreement led to separation of parent and child for several months-months
when the indigent parent had no access to the sophisticated legal and
medical investigation necessary to challenge the agency's charges of "shaken
baby syndrome."6' 9 Evidence was eventually uncovered which indicated that
the symptoms were likely to have been caused by routine, emergency
medical procedures and not by the alleged parental abuse.7" As another
example, one overworked emergency room doctor may determine that a
dislocated elbow was caused by abuse, while a specially trained physician
would recognize the injury as part of a family pattern of radial head
subluxations.7"
An even more disturbing outcome of an indeterminate voluntary
separation occurs when the separated family is shuffled aside and ignored
by caseworkers whose priorities are court cases.72 Such "agreed" separations
can drift for months with no clear plan for treatment of the child,
rehabilitation of the suspected abuser, or reunification of the family. 73 While
an initial emergency removal may be justified, prolonged and unsupervised
disruptions
are rarely helpful to the parents or the overall concerns of the
74
family.
In some states, a voluntary separation may result in the state acquiring
an unlimited amount of time to complete its investigation while still
achieving separation of the suspected parent from the child-a result that

69. In re C.R.S., 696 A.2d at 844.
70. Id.
71. Dale J. Townsend & George S. Bassett, Common Elbow Fracturesin Children,
53 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 2031, 204041 (1996) (stating that a radial head subluxation "refers
to an injury of the upper extremity in children in which the radial head, under forces of
forearm pronation and axial traction, slides under the annular ligament and becomes
entrapped"). These subluxations can occur in young children, either "spontaneously or with
inadvertent manipulation" such as "removing a shirt." Stephen J. Teach & Sara A.
Schutzman, Prospective Study of Recurrent Radial Head Subluxation, 150 ARCHIVES OF
PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 164, 165 (1996).
72. E.g., Pamela B., 709 A.2d at 1095.

73. E.g., id.; Lindsey v. Warren County Children & Youth Servs., No. 93-267 Erie,
mem. op. at 5 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 1996).
74. Pamela B., 709 A.2d at 1099-100 ("There can be no doubt that ... prolonged
delays resulting in disruption to families, in the absence of careful and exacting judicial
oversight, substantially interfere with the constitutional right of family integrity.").
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neither the state legislature nor the parent intended. In Pennsylvania, for
example, the agency is required by statute to complete its administrative
investigation within sixty days; thereafter, the administrative label for the
allegation must be reported as "unfounded" and cannot be reported as
"indicated.""5 The sixty-day limit attempts to avoid interminable
investigations that can leave both the child and the family at risk.76
However, Pennsylvania's Child Protective Services Law arguably creates a
loophole for the agency: if the agency fails to complete its investigation and
report any "indicated" finding within sixty days, the agency may actually
continue its investigation and eventually initiate a dependency lawsuit.
In Pennsylvania, the courts have refused to dismiss a subsequent
dependency action under the Pennsylvania Juvenile Act,77 even though such
a delayed investigation may result in the parent being the subject of a much
delayed "founded" report of child abuse, and labeled as such in the
administrative records maintained under the Child Protective Services Law. 78
An agency concerned about the safety of a child is likely to conduct a
prompt investigation. A voluntary separation, however, reduces the
agency's concern about safety or promptness. Thus, the Pennsylvania
agencies may have incentives to buy time with voluntary separations
because the caseworkers may believe they are accomplishing several goals:
protecting the child, giving the worker more time to investigate and, if
necessary, building a court case that will lead to a "founded" conclusion.
In some instances, the state's statutes may not provide for voluntary
separation agreements in the context of child abuse investigations. The
absence of clear statutory provisions governing the use of voluntary
agreements makes them particularly susceptible to misuse. In Pennsylvania,
for example, the two statutes governing child protective proceedings have
vaguely worded provisions for "informal adjustment"79 and "voluntary

75. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6368(c) (West Supp. 1998) ("The investigation by
the county agency to determine whether the report is 'founded,' 'indicated' or 'unfounded'
and whether to accept the family for service shall be completed within 60 days in all
cases.").

76.

Jd.

77.

42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

§§

6301-6365.

78. Cruz v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 472 A.2d 725, 729 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984);
cf. Cumberland County Children & Youth Servs. v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 611 A.2d
1339, 1342 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993) (holding that the penalty for the agency's delay beyond
sixty days is to render an initial report unfounded). See generally In re Kerr, 481 A.2d 1225
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (holding that no loss of jurisdiction occurred despite violation of tenday dependency hearing rule; any relief is properly limited to release of the child from

custody).
79.

42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

§ 6323.

850
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services,"8 neither of which provide adequate guidance for voluntary
separation agreements. 8'
Pennsylvania's Juvenile Act, for example, provides for an "informal
adjustment" process that appears to serve as a type of pre-trial diversion
process for youthful offenders if no "detention" is necessary.82 Although the
statutory provision for "informal adjustments" does not appear to have been
drafted with child abuse investigations in mind, the wording of the
Pennsylvania Juvenile Act sheds light on what should be included in any
voluntary agreement that affects the parent-child relationship.
For example, under Pennsylvania's informal adjustment provision,
"social agencies ... may give counsel and advice to the parties" in
proceedings under the Juvenile Act, "with a view to an informal
adjustment. 83 The informal process has a specific maximum time period
and "shall not extend beyond six months" without a court order.84 The
parties must be advised that consent to the informal adjustment is "not
obligatory." 85 The informal adjustment process is not intended to be a free
discovery period - "admissions" made by the participants during the
informal process are defined as "privileged."86 Thus, the informal adjustment
process involves three key features: a specific maximum duration with a
clear opportunity for judicial review, notice to the parties of their right to
reject the proposal, and clear benefits to family participants.
Interestingly, state officials have failed to recognize that the rationale for
placing limitations on informal adjustments applies equally well to voluntary
agreements for child abuse investigations. The rationale is summarized in
the history to the Model Juvenile Act, 87 on which Pennsylvania's law is
based:
There is ... danger that, unless controlled, the prospect that court

proceedings will be commenced and the fear of their consequences may
make the participation of parties an involuntary one, and their agreeing to
prescribed terms a product of compulsion. The provisions of this section
are intended to avoid possible abuse of these otherwise desirable efforts.8"

23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6370.
81. Id.; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6323; cf. 55 PA. CODE § 3130.65 (1996).
80.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
Id. § 6323(b).
Id. § 6323(c).
Id. § 6323(b)(2).
Id. § 6323(c).

§ 6323.

MODEL JUVENILE CT. ACT § 10 cmt., 9A U.L.A. 18, 19 (1987).

Id.
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Similarly, although the Pennsylvania Child Protective Services Law
contains references to voluntary services available to families in abuse or
neglect cases, 89 no statutory definition of voluntary participation is included
nor is there any statutory requirement that the state use a written agreement.
Pennsylvania county agencies are subject to child protective service
regulations that authorize but fail to mandate the use of detailed, written
"voluntary placement agreements."9 Agencies appear to use these
agreements rarely and only for "placements" of the child into formal foster
that they
care or state facilities. Experienced attorneys in some areas report
91
have never seen a written plan for parent/child separations.
On occasion, Pennsylvania's county agencies have attempted to
distinguish the need for written "voluntary placement agreements" in foster
care from situations where the mere separation of child and parent during
investigation requires only an unwritten "voluntary separation decision." 92
Officials may assert that the written, restricted agreements are necessary
only if "placement" occurs with a state or county agency's shelter or with
a formal foster family. 93 Such a distinction reflects the agency's decision
to give a technical, narrow reading for "placement," which does not exist
under the statute.94
More importantly, the distinction ignores the apparent purpose behind
the regulation, which provides very specific terms for written "voluntary
placement agreements." 95 It seems nonsensical to ignore the sound reasons
for providing clear notice to the parents of the terms and consequences of

89. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6370.
90. 55 PA. CODE § 3130.65 (1998). The agreement requires judicial approval after
thirty days and is required to contain the following:
(I) A statement of the parents' or legal guardian's right to be represented by legal
counsel or other spokesperson during conferences with the county agency about
voluntary placement.
(2) A statement of the parents' or legal guardian's right to refuse to place the child.
(3) A statement of the parents' or legal guardian's right to visit the child, to obtain
information about the child, and to be consulted about and approve medical and
educational decisions concerning the child while the child is in voluntary placement.
(4) A statement of the parents' or legal guardian's right to the immediate return of the
child upon request of the parent or guardian, unless the court orders the legal custody
of the child to be transferred to the county agency.
Id.
91. See Brief for Appellants at 36-37, Lindsey v. Warren County Children & Youth
Servs., 149 F.3d 1164 (3d Cir. 1998) (No. 96-3734).(copy in possession of author).
92. See id.
93. See id.; see also In re C.R.S., 696 A.2d 840, 841 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (noting
that the agency made no efforts to reunify the family after the children were voluntarily
placed with their grandparents).
94. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6303.
95. 55 PA. CODE § 3130.65.
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their decision to separate from the child because of the mere location of the
child or parent during the separation.96
Unfortunately, little statistical evidence exists to track the frequency of
use of voluntary agreements and thus provide a national record of fairness
or abuse in the consequences that follow. For example, the Pennsylvania
Department of Public Welfare does not collect statistics to track the
frequency of use of unwritten voluntary agreements, apparently on the
theory that such separations do not involve state costs. 97 One court focused
on the concern that county agencies were misusing the dependency process
to protect funding and to place children with "better" families than their
troubled, biological families.98 The court noted with apparent disapproval
the potential significance of one Pennsylvania agency's failure to provide a
copy of any written plan despite the agency's position that the mother had
voluntarily surrendered a "fundamental constitutional right." 99
Because of the closed nature of child abuse and juvenile case records,'00
it has often been difficult to obtain clear information about the various
approaches to investigation and the impact of so-called voluntary separation
decisions. In the past, courts have sometimes noted, but declined to address,
issues of voluntariness, treating them as merely "procedural."''
On other
occasions, courts have characterized the parents' decisions as "voluntary,"
but without giving sufficient factual histories to provide guidance on
whether such conclusions are appropriate. 0 2 In contrast to this history of
judicial tolerance of voluntary agreements, the Third Circuit in 1997
expressly rejected an agency's argument that a suspected parent's
compliance with its request to separate from his child during an
investigation created a voluntary waiver of the parent's rights to due
process.'03

96. See id. (defining "placement" as simply "[t]wenty-four hours out-of-home care
and supervision of a child"). But see id. § 3130.39 (regarding services and facilities which
may be used by the county).
97. E.g., 1995 PA. REPORT, supra note 2.
98. In re S.A.D., 555 A.2d 123, 125 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
99. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 22.
100. E.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6307 (limiting the inspection of all juvenile
court files and records).
101. E.g., In re C.R.S., 696 A.2d 840, 841 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
102. E.g., Good v. Dauphin County Soc. Servs. for Children & Youth, 891 F.2d 1087,
1094-95 (3d Cir. 1989) (reversing summary judgment despite district court's determination
that it was undisputed that plaintiff consented to admitting the social worker and the police
officer into her home). The court stated, "It is, of course, not our place to accept or reject
(the plaintiff's] sworn version of the facts, but the district court was not entitled to disregard
it." Id.
103. Croft v. Westmoreland County Children & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1126
n.4 (3d Cir. 1997).
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IV. THE CROFT CASE: THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S REJECTION OF THE
VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT AS A WAIVER OF DUE PROCESS

A. Summary
In the recent case of Croft v. WestmorelandCounty Children and Youth
Services, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected
the use of the "voluntary" label as justification for Pennsylvania's
interference with the family unit at the commencement of the investigation:
Defendants repeatedly have characterized [the father's] decision to leave
as "voluntary." This notion we explicitly reject. The threat that unless
[the father] left his home, the state would take this four-year-old daughter
and place her in foster care was blatantly coercive. The attempt to color
his decision in this light is not well taken.' 4
In Croft, the county's caseworker, acting as an investigator, went to the
home with a state trooper in response to an anonymous "hotline" call
suggesting possible sexual abuse of the daughter by the father.0 5 After
interviews of the parents and the child, the caseworker felt she did not have
enough information."° On the same night as the interviews she initiated the
separation of the father and child, by means of what the Third Circuit
viewed as an ultimatum,10 7 to give the county more time to complete the
investigation without immediate concern for the child's safety.0 8 The Third
Circuit concluded that the county's demand for separation occurred without
adequate grounds on which to base an objective belief in the likelihood of
imminent abuse or harm. 9 The conduct could not be excused or justified
as being a voluntary parental action."0 The court viewed such state action
as a violation of the parents' substantive due process rights:"'.

104. Id. at 1125 n.l.
105. Id. at 1124. The agency "was further told that the [four-year-old] child slept with
her parents and that she had recently been out of the house naked, walked to a neighbor's
house ... and told [them] that she was 'sleeping with mommy and daddy."' Id.
106. Id. at 1127 ("Most damaging to Defendants is [the caseworker's] deposition
testimony that, after the interviews, she had no opinion one way or the other whether sexual
abuse had occurred.").
107. Id. at 1124 ("[The caseworker] gave [the father] an ultimatum: unless he left his
home and separated himself from his daughter until the investigation was complete, she
would take [the daughter] physically from the home that night and place her in foster care.").
108. See id. at 1124-25.
109. Id. at 1126-27.
110. Id.
Ill. Id. at 1127.
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The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the
government from interfering in familial relationships unless the government
adheres to the requirements of procedural and substantive due process.
In determining whether the Crofts' constitutionally protected interests were
violated, we must balance the fundamental liberty interests of the family
unit with the compelling interests of the state in protecting children from
abuse. Whatever disruption or disintegration of family life the Crofts may
have suffered as a result of the county's child abuse investigation does not,
in and of itself, constitute a constitutional deprivation.
...However, a state has no interest in protecting the children from
their parents unless it has some reasonable and articulable evidence giving
rise to a reasonable suspicion that a child has been abused or is in
imminent danger of abuse." 2

Further, the court found that the state's apparent failure to seek any
post-separation judicial review, again relying on the fiction of the parents'
voluntary separation decision, created a procedural due process claim." 3 The
court concluded that the worker's conduct amounted to an arbitrary abuse
of power:
Considered in light of the circumstances surrounding the [caseworker's]
ultimatum, [the caseworker's] conduct was an arbitrary abuse of
government power. Based on her lack of an opinion regarding whether
sexual abuse had occurred, we hold that she lacked objectively reasonable
grounds to believe the child had been sexually abused or was in imminent
danger of sexual abuse." 4

Therefore, the Third Circuit reversed the district court's entry of summary
judgment for the county and remanded the case for further proceedings." 5
Although not discussed in the appellate opinion, Dr. Croft was separated
from his child for the relatively short period of ten days as a result of the
"blatantly coerced" agreement." 6 The separation ended after a psychologist
interviewed the child.' Dr. Croft, a veterinarian, is presumably a fairly

112. Id. at 1125-26.
113. Id. at 1125 n.3 ("We note here only that the policy of removing the suspected
parent from the family home during the pendency of child abuse investigations absent any
procedural safeguards raises a procedural due process issue.").
114. Id.at 1127.
115. Id.
116. Man Pushingfor Change in Child A buse Probes, SENTINEL (Carlisle, Pa), Sept.
10, 1997, at A2; $200,000 Payment Settles Lawsuit, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 25,

1997, at B3, available in 1997 WL 11834775.
117.

Man Pushing for Change in Child A buse Probes, supra note 116.
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sophisticated person and apparently had sufficient economic resources
to
8
secure expert help to resolve the allegations and reunite his family."1
Following remand, the county settled before trial for a reported
$200,000 and claimed to have spent around $50,000 on attorney's fees
during the four-year court battle." 9 After the settlement, Dr. Croft
commented to the media about the effect of his separation from his daughter
during the emotional investigation: "'Ifyou want a nice, easy way to destroy
someone's life, this is it.""' 2 Being forced to separate was unfair, he said,
because the investigation was based entirely on the anonymous tip. "'It's
harder to order a pizza than report a child abuse case .... With a pizza,1 at
2
least they call back to verify it just to make sure it's not a prank call."' '
Prior to Croft, complaints that challenged a state's role in the separation
of child and suspected parent were often dismissed on the basis of the
qualified nature of the parent's rights1 22 or because the defendants' had
successfully asserted immunity.'2 3 The forcefulness, not to mention the
dispatch, 24 with which the Third Circuit reached the due process issues by
rejecting the county's argument about the existence and effect of a voluntary
agreement is potentially ground-breaking. 2 ' The parameters of the Third
Circuit's decision in Croft are yet to be tested. Interestingly, one member
of the three-judge panel joined in "the preceding portions of the opinion,"
but was not "prepared at this juncture to hold that [the social worker's]
conduct violated the Crofts' constitutional rights, or that, on remand, the
Crofts are entitled to an automatic
summary judgment... as the majority
26
opinion seems to suggest."'1

118. See $200,000 Payment Settles Lawsuit, supra note 116.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. E.g., Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462-63 (8th Cir. 1987) ("In our view, the
parental liberty interest in keeping the family unit intact is not a clearly established right in
the context of reasonable suspicion that parents may be abusing children.").
123. See Defore v. Premore, 86 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 1996); Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer
Servs., 85 F.3d 1365, 1371 (8th Cir. 1996); Gottlieb v. County of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 517
(2d Cir. 1996); Frazier v. Bailey, 957 F.2d 920, 931 (1st Cir. 1992); see also Ernst v. Child
& Youth Servs., 108 F.3d 486, 496-97 (3d Cir. 1997) (recognizing absolute immunity for
certain actions of caseworkers); Myers v. Contra Costa County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 812
F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1987) (recognizing absolute immunity).
124. The County's defense that the search was voluntary was rejected by the Third
Circuit in a single footnote of less than sixty words. Croft v. Westmoreland County Children
& Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1125 n.1 (3d Cir. 1997).
125. E.g., Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 954 F. Supp. 1056, 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
("[T]he Third Circuit appears to break new ground .... Prior to Croft there were no clearly
established legal norms regarding the degree of suspicion a child welfare worker must
possess before initiating custody proceedings.").
126. Croft, 103 F.3d at 1127 n.6.
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B. Analysis
The Croft case is important in at least three respects. First, the Third
Circuit recognized both a substantive and procedural due process violation
arising out of a short-term separation despite the fact that the caseworker's
action was motivated, if not justified, by concern for the child's safety.'27
The court determined that even this degree of separation interferes with the
fundamental right of family integrity when initiated without
an objectively
2
reasonable suspicion of imminent danger to the child. 1
Second, in recognizing both substantive and procedural due process
violations, the court rejected the qualified immunity defense raised by the
caseworker. 129 Thus, the court came close to stating that, as a matter of law,
caseworkers should not seek voluntary removal of a parent or child based
wholly on an anonymous tip of abuse, at least not if the parents deny the
abuse and no physical corroboration exists. 30 Such a holding has important
ramifications because this fact pattern is not uncommon during the early
stages of -an investigation. 3 '
These two points depend on the third important aspect of the Croft
case-the Third Circuit's threshold rejection, apparently as a matter of law,
of the government's argument that there was no constitutional issue because
the parents had consented to a separation plan. 2 The placement of this key
point in a footnote potentially masks the significance of the Court's clear
rejection of the voluntary label. 3
The Third Circuit's decision provides a basis for parents to contend in
future suits that the law is "clearly established" that social workers must
have an articulable, reasonable suspicion that the child is in imminent
danger before initiating any emergency separation or even an "agreement"

127. Id. at 1125-26.
128. Id. at 1125 ("We recognize the constitutionally protected liberty interests that
parents have in the custody, care[,) and management of their children.... [T]his liberty
interest in familial integrity is limited by the compelling governmental interest in the
protection of children - particularly where the children need to be protected from their own
parents.").
129. Id.at 1125, 1127.
130. See id. at 1126-27.
131. See Doug Brown, Abuse Cases Test Skills, Emotions of Investigators,
ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Sept. 15, 1997, at Al, A3.
The cases are difficult to pursue because the only witness is usually the young victim,
and frequently there is no physical evidence.... [E]xperts say, some of the children
spend so much time with different "caretakers"-parents, uncles, aunts, grandparents,
siblings, babysitters[, l and neighbors-that even if police and prosecutors can determine
abuse occurred, it is almost impossible to pin the crime on an offender.
Id.
132. Croft, 103 F.3d at 1125 n.l.
133. Id.
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to separate. 34 Certainly, this decision suggests that agencies should not feel
safe in relying on "agreements" as justification for ignoring the due process
requirements of most child welfare laws. The Third Circuit decided a few
months after Croft to recognize absolute immunity for "prosecutorial"
actions taken by social workers "in preparing for, initiating, and
prosecuting" dependency actions.'35 However, this expansion of immunity
does not appear to include the "police-like" actions of investigating abuse
and removing children prior to initiating judicial process.'3 6
The Third Circuit cited no direct precedent for its holding that rejected
a caseworker's solicitation of voluntary agreements and recognized her
liability for failing to have an independent basis for emergency removal.'3 7
The major cases cited in Croft decline to accept consensual or voluntary
labels as a primary justification for separating a parent and child, but they
do accept those labels in the context of other facts that establish an
independent basis for the caseworkers' emergency action.'38
Taken together, the Third Circuit's decision and prior circuit court
decisions may provide an incentive for caseworkers to deviate from the truth
if called upon to testify. A caseworker may feel compelled to manufacture
"alternative" grounds for removal or separation if called upon to justify his
or her actions in seeking a questionable voluntary agreement. The candor
with which the caseworker testified in the Croft case about her desire for
more information before seeking judicial approval of any removal is unlikely
to happen again, at least not if agencies counsel their employees to avoid the
Croft trap.

134. See, e.g., Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 954 F. Supp. 1056, 1064 (E.D. Pa.
1997).
135. Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs., 108 F.3d 486, 493-98 (3d Cir. 1997) ("With this
holding, we join the courts of appeals of the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits [in recognizing absolute immunity].").
136. Id. at 497 n.7 ("We emphasize that our holding concerns only actions taken by
child welfare workers in the context of dependency proceedings. Like our sister courts...
we would be unwilling to accord absolute immunity to 'investigative or administrative'
actions taken by child welfare workers outside the context of a judicial proceeding."); see
also Good v. Dauphin County Soc. Servs., 891 F.2d 1087 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that the
social worker and police officer were not entitled to qualified immunity for alleged entry into
the home without a warrant); Robinson v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 919-20 (2d Cir. 1987) ("[The
assistant state's attorney] and [the state trooper] have not sustained their burden of showing
that the seizure, without a court order, of children in order to pursue an investigation of
alleged child abuse should be accorded absolute immunity."); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d
1437, 1462 n.20 (8th Cir. 1987) ("[T]he removal of children from the homes of persons
arrested for sexual abuse is not case initiation, presentation or even preparation, at least when
the arrests were not for the abuse of the children being removed.").
137. Cmft, 103 F.3d at 1126.
138. Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Servs., Inc., 85 F.3d 1365, 1369 n.2, 1371 (8th
Cir. 1996); Gottlieb v. County of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 520 (2d Cir. 1996).
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In Croft, the court overlooked the likely reason the social w6rker failed
to develop additional facts before seeking separation-her belief, however
poorly based, that there was a valid voluntary agreement in place. Thus,
while parents' rights advocates will be tempted to embrace the Croft
decision with open arms, the decision leaves the door open to questions
about how courts should analyze parental issues of voluntariness in the
future. As a practical matter, government officials in future cases will likely
(1) continue to urge some form of voluntary separation agreements; (2) raise
such agreements as a defense to due process claims; (3) attempt to
distinguish Croft by asserting facts that they believe are less indicative of
government intimidation; and (4) encouragepost hoc rationalization by their
caseworkers, pushing them to express "alternative" grounds for taking
protective action.'39 Thus, after Croft, the question remains: should
caseworkers ever rely on the parents' agreement to separate during the
investigation as a waiver of the traditional child welfare process?
As the Second Circuit has noted, the use of agreements, whereby the
investigated parent separates from the child temporarily without court
involvement, may be useful for all parties. 4 ° The Second Circuit was
unwilling to reject categorically the use of such a tool during child abuse
investigations in New York:
[F]rom the departing parent's standpoint, judicial review may not be the
preferred method of resolving the matter, for the statutory procedures
envision a hearing within three days, and the evidence or allegations may
be such that the parent believes the matter likely cannot be adjudicated
quickly. He may well consider it in his or his family's best interest to
have the investigation proceed on a cooperative basis rather than by
adjudication. The imposition of an automatic requirement that the agency
seek a court order even after a parental departure would
4 deprive the parent
of the option to proceed on a nonadjudicative basis.' 1
For example, in another New York case, the parents arguably were able
to use their willingness to cooperate and to separate temporarily from the
child as a way to encourage the agency to investigate immediately the other
possible sources of injury, successfully diverting the spotlight from

139. See, e.g., Weller v. Department of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990)
(dismissing one claim of civil rights violation because of a "voluntary surrender" of the
parent's liberty interest by sending child to grandmother in March 1986, but permitting claim
for removal from custody to go forward in July 1986 where pleadings established no
agreement and no post-removal hearing).
140. Gottlieb, 84 F.3d at 522.
141. Id.
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themselves as the suspected abusers. 4 2 If, however, all such arrangements
are void or voidable, under the Third Circuit's approach, agencies risk
economic suicide, in a civil rights litigation sense, by suggesting them. In
turn, parents may lose the opportunity to choose a voluntary separation as
a non-litigation tool to facilitate a careful investigation of the allegations.
The Second and Third Circuits appear to have fundamentally different
philosophies on the viability of a voluntary separation agreement entered
into by suspected parents during an abuse investigation. The Second Circuit
recognizes a potential value to the parents and the child from entering into
such an agreement and thereby avoiding immediate litigation.'4 3 When such
separations are challenged in a civil rights suit, the Second Circuit appears
to ignore the factual nature of the voluntariness issues, at least as long as the
state can show there was an independent factual basis for emergency
removal. In contrast, the Third Circuit in Croft appeared to condemn any
such agreement as inherently coerced. The inconsistency in the approaches
flows from an incomplete analysis of voluntary or consensual actions.
Although the Third Circuit seems to have the more persuasive reaction to
the fictional voluntary label, its analysis seemingly misses a step.
Significantly, in Croft, the Third Circuit failed to acknowledge that
consent has traditionally been a lawful, alternative basis for otherwise
intrusive governmental action. For example, sometimes the individual and
the state have mutual interests in the individual's consent to otherwise
intrusive government action, such as vehicle searches and home searches. 144
Where consent is validly obtained and can be established in court, the
government45 entity does not also need to prove the existence of reasonable
suspicion.
[O]ften ... an effort is made to obtain consent for a search in
circumstances where probable cause is lacking and thus no search warrant
could be obtained. If consent is given, evidence may thereby be uncovered
in a situation where there was no other lawful basis for making the search.
Or, if consent is given but nothing incriminating is found, this will likewise

be of benefit to the police, for often the fruitless search will clear the
suspect and permit the police to divert their efforts elsewhere." 4

142.

Dietz v. Damas, 932 F. Supp. 431, 434-41 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).

143.

See Gottlieb, 84 F.3d at 522.

144. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973) ("[A car] search
pursuant to consent may result in considerably less inconvenience for the subject of the
search, and properly conducted is a constitutionally permissible and wholly legitimate aspect
of effective police activity.").
145. Id.
146. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 8.1, at 597 (3d ed. 1996 & Supp.
1998) (citations omitted).
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Similarly, when parents give confessions outside the confines of custodial
interrogations, the court may, depending on the circumstances, treat the
confessions as voluntary waivers of the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, even in the absence of Miranda warnings.'4 7
In the context of a criminal proceeding, a defendant's challenge to the
voluntariness of a consent to search or to the waiver of the privilege against
self-incrimination is usually resolved in a factual hearing. 4 ' The Third
Circuit, however, did not remand for a factual hearing on the voluntariness
issue. It simply concluded that this father's agreement to leave his home
was non-voluntary without explaining whether such a conclusion was limited
to the facts of the Croft case or whether all such agreements are to be
condemned as a matter of law. 4 ' Thus, Croft generates important policy
questions:
* Should voluntary separation decisions ever be considered a valid basis
for bypassing the steps for emergency separations found in the typical child
welfare statutory scheme?
* If voluntary agreements are potentially valid, by what standard should
voluntariness be tested?' 50
Before answering these questions, it is first helpful to review other
contexts in which voluntary citizen actions may be treated as waivers of
important rights.
V. TESTING THE VOLUNTARINESS OF THE PARENTS' SEPARATION
DECISION

The Third Circuit rejected the fiction of a voluntary separation when
offered by the state as justification for its avoidance of statutory due process

147. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.7, at 514
(1984) ("It is thus clear that a statement not preceded by the Miranda warnings will be
admissible when, for example, the defendant walks into a police station and confesses or
blurts out an admission when approached by an officer near a crime scene.").
148. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 106 F.3d 794, 796-97 (7th Cir. 1997)
(reviewing facts shown at hearing and trial establishing voluntaritiess of consent to search a
vehicle); United States v. White, 750 F.2d 726, 728 (8th Cir. 1984) (reviewing facts that
show a clear waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination).
149. See Croft v. Westmoreland County Children & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123 (3d
Cir. 1997).
150. See Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 826-27 (2d Cir. 1977) (citing Boone
v. Wyman, 295 F. Supp. 1143, 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)) (discussing parental "consent" as a
defense).
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requirements.'' In contrast, the Second Circuit recognized that parents may
actually benefit from entering into a separation agreement, particularly if it
permits the parents time to marshall their defense for any later judicial
proceeding.5 2 Therefore, the Second Circuit appeared to tolerate the fiction,
53
at least as long as the facts supported the need for emergency action.
Neither of these all-or-nothing approaches is entirely satisfactory.
Rather than simply condemning or ignoring the voluntary agreement, the
courts should instead recognize standards by which an agreement can be
created that protects the interests of both the state and the suspected parents.
Factors should be identified to guide authorities in determining whether an
alternative to judicial review should be offered to parents. Once the legal
standard is determined, the court can then determine the factual issues on a
case-by-case basis. 5 4 Therefore, historical perspective on the legal tests for
voluntary actions and consent to intrusive government actions is helpful.
A. Comparison: Voluntariness as a Concern in Civil Cases
The inherent power of certain parties to coerce or force cooperation
from individuals has often been the focus of judicial concern in civil
matters.' In civil transactions, courts most often raise this concern when
one party has great economic or political power over another weaker or less
sophisticated party. Thus, for example, at common law, courts have been
severe disparities
willing to examine contracts of adhesion, recognizing that 156
in power may invalidate otherwise "agreed upon" terms.

151. See Croft, 103 F.3d at 1125 n.I.
152. See Gottlieb v. County of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 517 (2d Cir. 1996).
153. Id. at 520, 522.
154. See Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Servs., Inc., 85 F.3d 1365, 1369 n.2 (8th Cir.
1996) (concluding that the defendants failed to establish "beyond genuine dispute" the fact
of voluntary consent to separation); see also Hurlman v. Rice, 927 F.2d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 1991)
(noting that existence of genuine issue of material fact as to whether parent's release of child
to state trooper was voluntary precluded summary judgment).
155. See, e.g., William Wesley Patton, The Worid Where Parallel Lines Converge: The
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Concurrent Civil and Criminal Child Abuse
Prceedings,24 GA. L. REV. 473 (1990). Compare Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972)
(effect of confession of judgment procedure on debtors with less than $10,000 yearly income)
with D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972) (effect of confession ofjudgment
procedure on commercially sophisticated debtor).
156. See JOHN CALAMARI & JOSEPH PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 3, at 6
(1970).
[C]ontracts of "adhesion" have frequently been denied their intended effect by a process
of strained interpretation. In the landmark case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., [161 A.2d 69 (1960),] the court dealt with the matter in more forthright fashion,
denying any effect to a clause in an adhesion contract deemed to be unfair.
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In modem times, the related issues of voluntariness, waiver, and consent
have often led to judicial review and the creation of common law standards
to evaluate the weaker or less sophisticated party's "voluntary consent."' 57
Where the party claiming waiver in a civil transaction is a government
entity, the courts have found it reasonable to require the state to prove that
it first informed the private individual of the relevant law." 8 Courts have
put the burden on the party who relies on the civil waiver or consent to
establish the "knowing and intelligent" nature of the opposing party's
action: 159 "To make proof of waiver of a legal right there must be clear,
unequivocal and decisive action of the party with knowledge of such right
showing a purpose to surrender such right on his part." '160 For example,
courts have required insurance companies to use specific written terms to
6
obtain a valid waiver by a policy holder of uninsured motorist coverage.'
Often legislators later replace or supplement the judicial standards by
enacting statutes that require even more stringent efforts to ensure "knowing
and intelligent" waivers. 62 The voluntariness 63of a questionable waiver of
rights is usually treated as a question of fact.

157. See, e.g., Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 133
F.3d 816, 819 (11th Cir. 1998) ("The waiver of... remedial rikhts [under the ADA] ...
,must be closely scrutinized,' and a court must look to the totality of the circumstances to
determine whether the release is knowing and voluntary."); Erie Telecomms., Inc. v. City of
Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1096 (3d Cir. 1988) (setting forth standard of review for contractual
waiver of certain constitutional rights).
158. See Wohlgemuth v. Armacost, 336 A.2d 455, 456-57, 458 n. I (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1975) (rejecting Department of Public Welfare's argumient that benefit recipient had waived
refund because officials failed to inform her of change of law: "By way of analogy, we note
the well-established principle that the waiver of a legal right requires a 'clear ...act of the
party with knowledge of such right"').
159. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Department of Banking, 286 A.2d 480 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1972) (involving the effect of recent change of law on opponent's right to obtain
information; holding that the proponent of waiver failed to prove waiver had occurred in a
dispute over application for a branch bank); see also Cole v. Philadelphia Co., 26 A.2d 920,
921, 924 (Pa. 1942) (holding that lessee's purported waiver of royalty payments under oil and
gas lease is question of fact, and not of law).
160. Cole, 26 A.2d at 924.
161. See Johnson v. Concord Mut. Ins. Co., 300 A.2d 61, 64-65 (Pa. 1973) (holding
a purported waiver of uninsured motorist coverage insufficient where agent failed to properly
explain important protections being released; requiring written waivers).
162. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (1994) (providing specific release procedures
adopted by Older Workers Benefits Protection Act); see also Tukovits v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
672 A.2d 786, 789-91 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (holding waiver invalid where insurer failed to
use language mandated by statute for waiver of uninsured motorist coverage and could not
provide specific evidence that insured read or had explained to him the limited coverage).
163. See, e.g., Jordan v. Fox, 20 F.3d 1250, 1272 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Swarb and
Overmyer plainly decide a debtor can waive its due process rights ... when it voluntarily
and intelligently consents to an agreement containing a cognovit clause. Nevertheless [these
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In the civil context, where waivers of important rights are at issue, the
courts have often listed factors that the court will consider in determining
whether there was a "knowing and intelligent" action that created an
enforceable a voluntary waiver."6 For example, in determining whether an
employee's waiver of a right to claim job discrimination is enforceable, the
courts have considered the following factors:
*

whether the waiver is in writing;

*

whether the agreement is clear;

* whether the waiver specifically acknowledges that the employee's
action is voluntary;
*

whether the employee has any formal education or is relatively

sophisticated;

* whether the employee had any time to study the waiver before entering
into the agreement;
* whether the employee had the assistance of independent advice, and
specifically, of legal counsel;
* whether the specific consideration received by the employee for
agreeing to the waiver exceeded what he would have received without the
waiver; and
* whether the employer attempted
65 to encourage or discourage the
employee to consult with a lawyer.
The courts have recognized that civil waivers or consent are valuable
tools for both the relatively powerful and the relatively weak to reach
agreements that avoid protracted litigation. 166 Nonetheless, where important
personal rights are involved, the courts have stressed the need to establish

Supreme Court opinions] also indicate waiver is usually a question of fact.").
164. See Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 133 F.3d
816, 819-20 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that summary judgment was inappropriate where
"factors raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiffs voluntarily and
knowingly executed the release agreements"); Rivera-Flores v. Bristol-Myers Squibb
Caribbean, 112 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1997) ("This court has endorsed a 'totality of
circumstances' approach to determining the validity of the waiver [of civil rights under Title
VII and ADA]. We have found helpful, but not exclusive, a set of six factors .
); Finz
v. Schlesinger, 957 F.2d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 1992) (identifying six factors).
165. Finz, 957 F.2d at 82.

166. See Rivera-Flores, 112 F.3d at 11 ("Such releases provide a means of voluntary
resolution of potential and actual legal disputes, and mete out a type of industrial justice.").
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the "knowing" character of the action and have been reluctant167to adopt a
mechanical, single-factor rule that presumes voluntary waiver.
B. Comparison: Voluntariness as a ConstitutionalConcern in
Criminal Cases
In the criminal context, an individual may waive many of the most
fundamental protections afforded by the Constitution: 68 "The most basic
rights of criminal defendants are ... subject to waiver."' 69 As with civil
cases in which there is a disparity of power between parties, in criminal
matters, courts have routinely expressed concern that the government should
prove that purported waivers of important rights were voluntary and
knowing.' 70 Generally, as the demonstrated potential for the governmental
authority to overwhelm the individual's will increases, the court's
willingness to scrutinize the voluntariness issue increases.' 7 ' In some
instances, courts have adopted a prophylactic approach, requiring specific
steps, including detailed warnings or written waivers, to establish a
minimum threshold of protection for the individual.'7 2
A review of the various nuances in testing voluntariness in criminal
cases is beyond the scope of this article. However, the test for voluntary
consent to search under the Fourth Amendment seems particularly
relevant. 73 Some courts have specifically used a Fourth Amendment
analysis to test the constitutionality of state actions when police have
assisted private parties in resolving child custody disputes, noting that
"officials may remove the child from the custody of the parent without
74
consent or a prior court order only in 'emergency' circumstances."'1

167. See Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 820 ("The district court should not have summarily
adopted a decision from another case, even though it dealt with the exact same release form.
Each factor should be independently analyzed.... [W]e conclude that ajury question exists
about whether Bledsoe voluntarily and knowingly released ADA and Rehabilitation Act
claims.").
168. E.g., Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 10 (1987) (holding that a double jeopardy
defense is waivable by pre-trial agreement); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969)
(noting that a knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives privilege against compulsory selfincrimination, right to jury trial, and right to confront one's accusers); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458 (1938) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is waivable).
169. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991).
170. See Ricketts, 483 U.S. at 9-10; Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-43; Johnson, 304 U.S.
at 467-69.
171. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring that warnings be given
to suspects prior to custodial interrogation).
172. Id.
173. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
174. Hurlman v. Rice, 927 F.2d 74, 80 (2d Cir. 1991) (emphasis added); see also
Bennett v. Town of Riverhead, 940 F. Supp. 481, 488 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (officer removed
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On the issue of voluntary consent to search under the Fourth
Amendment, the Supreme Court has differentiated between a standard which
would require proof that the individual's action was "knowing and
intelligent" and a standard which requires merely that the individual's action
be shown to be a product of "free choice."'7 In Schneckloth v.
Bustamnonte,'76 the Supreme Court addressed the standard of review to
determine the validity of a "consensual" search of a car during a traffic
stop.' The majority reviewed the law on voluntary confessions,'78 noting
that the ultimate test is whether a confession is the product of an "essentially
free and unconstrained choice by its maker,"'7 9 a determination that requires
an assessment of the "totality of all the surrounding circumstances-both the
characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation."' 80
Ultimately, the Schneckloth majority adopted a "totality of
circumstances" approach and rejected a "knowing and intelligent waiver"
approach, distinguishing the more threatening custodial interrogation that
requires a stricter standard from supposedly less threatening situations such
as field questioning and searches.' The majority concluded that the latter
standard requires only a "demonstrat[ion] that the consent was in fact
voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or
implied."' 2
[W]hen the subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to
justify a search on the basis of his consent... [v]oluntariness is a question
of fact to be determined from all the circumstances, and while the subject's

child from home).
175. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 246-49.
176. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).

177. Id.
178. Id. (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1963); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.

278 (1936)).
179. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225 (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,
602 (1961)).
180. Id. at 225-26. The Court concluded:
As with police questioning, two competing concerns must be accommodated in
determining the meaning of a "voluntary" consent [to search]-the legitimate need for
such searches and the equally important requirement of assuring the absence of coercion.
But the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a consent not be coerced, by
explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force. For, no matter how subtly
the coercion was applied, the resulting "consent" would be no more than a pretext for
the unjustified police intrusion against which the Fourth Amendment is directed.
Id. at 227-28.

181.

Id. at 248-49.

182.

Id. at 248.
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knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the
prosecution is not required to demonstrate
such knowledge as a prerequisite
83
to establishing a voluntary consent.

The Schneckloth majority's adoption of a "totality of circumstances test" has
been widely criticized by those who prefer the analysis of Justice Marshall's
dissent,'84 which would impose upon the prosecution the more specific
burden of showing that there was a knowing and intelligent waiver.'85
Following Schneckloth, courts have evaluated consents to search by
looking at several factors, in much the same way that courts have identified
factors which affect the decision to waive important rights in civil contexts.
For example, in "search" cases, courts have evaluated the conduct of the
government actors to see whether the authorities made any express or
implied false claim that no consent was necessary; whether there was a show
of force; whether there was any "threat" to "obtain a warrant"; or whether
there was any other deceitful practice.' 86 In addition, courts have looked to
the characteristics of the waiving party, including factors such as the
maturity or sophistication of the consenting party; any prior or subsequent
refusals; whether Mirandawarnings were given; and whether the individual
had an effective opportunity to consult with counsel.'8 7 These factual
inquiries may lead to a somewhat burdensome process for the courts;
however, the courts have consistently emphasized the importance of

183. Id. at 248-49.
184. See LAFAVE, supra note 146, § 8.1(a), at 602-05; see also Tracey Maclin, Justice
Thurgood Marshall: Taking the FourthAmendment Seriously, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 723, 794
(1992) ("The majority's analysis is unfair to the average citizen. The Court's crabbed
definition of consent denies a person the knowledge that he or she has a right to refuse a
police officer's request.").
185. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 284-89 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall's
analysis, based in part upon the Court's prior decision in Bumperv. North Carolina,391 U.S.
543 (1968), focuses on the need to put limitations on the implicit authority of the police as
a necessary balance of state power vis-A-vis the individual's basic civil rights:
[I]n Bumper v. North Carolina, four law enforcement officers went to the home of
Bumper's grandmother. They announced that they had a search warrant, and she
permitted them to enter. Subsequently, the prosecutor chose not to rely on the warrant,
but attempted to justify the search by the woman's consent. We held that consent
could not be established "by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful
authority ......
If consent to search means that a person has chosen to forgo his right to exclude the
police from the place they seek to search, it follows that his consent cannot be
considered a meaningful choice unless he knew that he could in fact exclude the police.
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 283-85.
186. See LAFAVE, supra note 146, § 8.2.
187. Id.
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avoiding the creation of any presumption of waiver where important rights
are involved.'88
C. The Hybrid Nature of Voluntariness in Child Welfare Cases
Although courts have struggled with the precise definition of parental
rights,'89 they agree that the Constitution recognizes and protects the
individual's essential interest arising out of the status of being a "parent."'' 90
In a frequently quoted passage, the Supreme Court has articulated a
constitutionally protected parental interest in the "care, custody, and
management of [their] children."' 9' The protection is founded in the
Fourteenth Amendment, 9 2 which provides that "[n]o State shall.., deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."' 93

188. Id.
§ 8.1(b).
189. E.g., Frazier v. Bailey, 957 F.2d 920, 930 (Ist Cir. 1992) ("Lower courts have
observed the difficulties of finding a 'clearly established' constitutional right in the context
of family relationships.").
190. The concept of "parent" for purposes of constitutional protection involves more
than mere biology. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123-24 (1989); Lehr
v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983).
191. Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (quoting Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)); see also Lehr, 463 U.S. at 258 ("[T]he court has found
that the relationship of love and duty in a recognized family unit is an interest in liberty
entitled to constitutional protection."); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 n.7 (1982)
(rejecting the claim that "a parental rights termination proceeding does not interfere with a
fundamental liberty interest").
192. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116(1996); Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574
(1987); Lehr, 463 U.S. at 256; Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658; Croft v. Westmoreland County
Children & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1125 (3d Cir. 1997); Joyner v. Dumpson, 533 F.
Supp. 233, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'don other grounds, 712 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1983).
The parents' right to be with their child has been described as a "fundamental liberty
interest," Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753, and as an "abstract" liberty interest, Frazier,957 F.2d
at 929, and more specifically as "a fundamental right to family integrity" and as a right to
privacy, Alsager v. District Ct., 406 F. Supp. 10, 15 (S.D. Iowa 1975). The parent's liberty
interest is also sometimes defined in terms of "personal choice" or "privacy." Cleveland Bd.
of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) (discussing freedom of personal choice
in matters of family life under the Due Process Clause to the Fourteenth Amendment); Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (referring to the "private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter").
Despite this case law, the parent's fundamental liberty interest remains somewhat
imprecise in scope. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§ 11.7, at 401 (5th ed. 1995) ("All that can be said with certainty is that the Justices have
selected a group of individual rights which do not have a specific textual basis in the
Constitution or its Amendments and deemed them to be 'fundamental."').
193. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
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In familial relationships, the constitutional focus should be on the
"liberty" nature of the right, rather than on any "property"
characterization. 9 4 This "fundamental liberty interest... does not evaporate
simply because they have not been model parents. . . ."'9' A claim for
denial of due process based on interference with the parents' liberty interest
is triggered by the authorities' unjustified and substantial interference with
the parents' right to live together with their child as a family."9
However, when the allegation is abuse by a parent, the courts are quick
to point out that while the parent's liberty interest enjoys some measure of
constitutional protection, it is nonetheless limited by the mutual interest of
the child and the state in the child's safety. 197 Thus, the parent's liberty
interest, however fundamental in nature, is "not absolute."' 19 Rather, "[t]he
liberty interest in familial relations is limited by the compelling
governmental interest in protection of minor children, particularly in
circumstances where the protection is considered necessary as against the
parents themselves."' 99
A child abuse investigation can lead to significant criminal and civil
consequences, including criminal charges and the temporary-or possibly
permanent-loss of the parent-child relationship. As such, caseworkers
suggest that parents enter into voluntary agreements that are hybrid in
nature, requiring the parent to waive--or at least significantly postponefundamental rights. Thus, as suggested by the foregoing discussion of
voluntariness in civil and criminal case contexts, the courts should not
assume that any parent's action was voluntary, at least not unless certain
minimum facts are present. Where factual challenges are made to the
voluntariness of the separation decision, the courts should be willing to

194. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759 (recognizing that the parent's interest in child
custody is an interest more precious than property rights).
195. Id. at 753.
196. See Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977). But see Dietz v.
Damas, 932 F. Supp. 431, 434 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that nonvoluntary weekend
placement of child with grandparents and subsequent twelve-day delay in seeking judicial
approval was not a basis for section 1983 suit where parents were "given complete access
...subject only to supervision by the maternal grandparents").
197. E.g., Frazier,957 F.2d at 929-30 ("Within a family itself resides the sometimes
competing interests of a parent's right to rear his or her child and the fundamental rights of
that child."); In re William L., 383 A.2d 1228, 1236 (Pa. 1978) ("The state may ...
constitutionally require the rights of parents to yield to the child's essential health and safety
needs.").
198. Croft v. Westmoreland County Children & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1125
(citing Martinez v. Mafchir, 35 F.3d 1486, 1490 (10th Cir. 1994); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d
1437, 1462 (8th Cir. 1987)). For example, if the parent is proven to be unfit, the relationship
of parent and child can be terminated by law. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769 (requiring
proof by clear and convincing evidence to terminate parental rights).
199. Myers, 810 F.2d at 1462.
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review facts that realistically affect the voluntariness of the particular
parent's action. °° The inquiry into the voluntariness of the parent's
separation action should, at a minimum, include:
* whether the caseworker used precise language to describe the parents'
alternatives;
* whether the separation idea was initiated by the caseworker or by the
parents;
* whether either or both of the parents are suspects in the investigation
and whether they have been questioned;
* whether an indication of involuntariness arises either from the timing
of any request to separate or from the location where the request is made;
• whether the caseworker had the intimidating "assistance" of law
enforcement officials;
* whether the parents are legally unsophisticated, indigent, or
emotionally distraught;
* whether the parents were permitted to consult with counsel or are even
able to afford legal counsel;
* whether the rights of both parents were described accurately, including
the use of any written warnings or notices; and
. whether there is any deceptive language or tactics used by the
caseworker. 01
For example, application of these specific factors in Croft lead to the
following observations: the social worker and a state trooper appeared at the
parents' home suddenly, and at night, thus creating an intimidating
atmosphere; 22 they questioned the parents extensively as the suspects of an
anonymous tip about sexual abuse of their four year-old daughter, a situation
that was undoubtedly frightening;0 3 the parents denied any abuse and there
was no physical corroboration of abuse."1 Nonetheless, the caseworker
200. Cf LAFAVE, supra note 146, § 8.2.
201. See King v. Olmstead Co. 117 F.2d 1065, 1067 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding mere
verbal threats are not actionable, especially since parents had counsel); see also Good v.
Dauphin County Soc. Servs., 891 F.2d 1087, 1094 (3d Cir. 1989) (rejecting qualified
immunity for a social worker and police officer who gained entry through untrue claim that
they had warrant); cf Whisman v. Rinehart, 119 F.3d 1303, 1310 (8th Cir. 1997) (court
noting with disapproval that social worker allegedly gave false information to parent on how
to obtain the return of their child).
202. Croft, 103 F.3d at 1124.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1127.
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pushed for separation, using words that both the parents and the court found
to be threatening." 5 The defendant apparently presented no evidence that
the parents were given specific notice of their rights under the law to have
a judicial review, or that if such a hearing was held, that the state would
have a very significant burden of proof.2" These factors, if separately
considered, would have supported the Third Circuit's conclusion that the
father's pressure-ridden agreement to leave the home was nonvoluntary.
However, it also appears that the Crofts were sophisticated professionals
and had the money or means necessary to consult a lawyer within hours of
the "consented" separation.' °7 A more complete factual hearing could have
led to a finding that the separation was voluntary. By contrast, the typical
parent identified as a suspect in a child abuse investigation is
unsophisticated and often has no funds with which to consult an attorney.0 8
While there may be no overt show of force in the typical parent's case, as
a practical matter, many voluntary separation decisions should more
correctly be labeled as involuntary.
D. A nswering the Questions Raised by Croft
An involuntary separation of a child and parent, for even a temporary
period, involves a greater potential for harmful interference with individual
rights-and for long-term negative effects on the entire family-than does
any confession or search. "Among the state's many powers, none is more
fearsome than the power to take a child away from a parent. Challenged
exercises of this power deserve close judicial scrutiny."20 9 This need for
scrutiny is particularly true in a time when high numbers of child abuse
allegations are being reported, but without a direct correlation to proven
instances of abuse.2 10 When the cycle of public and media attention focuses
on child abuse, county agencies may feel pressured to use overly
intimidating approaches to investigation and may be tempted to use
voluntary separation decisions for improper purposes.

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id.at 1124.
Id.
Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 118.
See sources cited, supra note 20.
Pfoltzer v. County of Fairfax, 775 F: Supp. 874, 877 (E.D. Va. 1991).
210. See NATIONAL CTR. ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, supra note 1.For example,
in Pennsylvania, hospitals are among the most frequent sources reporting suspected abuse,
and courts pay great attention to the opinions of treating doctors; however, the mere
suspicions of careful doctors are sometimes overemphasized. See, e.g., In re C.R.S., 696
A.2d at 843-45 (emphasizing that doctors eventually conceded the possibility of accidental
injury and admitted that they had been unaware of key facts supporting a conclusion of
accidental injury). Finally, sixty percent of the hospitals' reports on suspected abuse in 1995
led to no "findings" or "indications" of abuse. See 1995 PA. REPORT, supra note 2, at 7.
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Where evidence of imminent threat or danger to the child clearly exists,
government authorities are already armed with the potent tool of immediate,
warrantless removal of the child followed by judicial review. In the
majority of instances, the government pressure on a parent for an amorphous
voluntary separation agreement is inappropriate."1 ' Certainly, in some
instances, parents can and should make a separation decision in response to
the request of an investigating government authority; if, however, state
authorities wish to avoid future challenges to such decisions, they should
adopt and utilize clear written agreements. 2 ' Such separation agreements
should be limited to a reasonable, specific maximum duration.
The parent should be given clear notice of the right to consult with
counsel, should be provided with counsel if indigent, and should be given
notice of the right to terminate the separation or placement with a simple
request. 13 Clear, written temporary separation agreements should help
alleviate concerns that parents and courts have expressed about the need for
informed consent to government actions that interfere with fundamental
parental rights.
If disputes arise, the voluntary separation should end and the family
should be reunited within a specific number of hours. If the state wishes to
continue state control over the child, it should be promptly required to
present supporting evidence.21 4 Any challenge to the voluntariness of the
agreement will usually occur in the context of a civil rights suit.2 15 If the
government authorities have not adopted minimum safeguards, such as a
written separation agreement, courts may summarily reject the
reasonableness of the state action as a matter of law, as occurred in Croft.
However, in a factual dispute, and even if the government used a written
separation agreement, the government must still satisfy a heavy burden to
show that the particular parents were given notice of the information
necessary to make an informed decision to separate. This burden is similar
to burdens allocated in routine civil matters such as informed consent for

211. Cf Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 1154, 1158
(9th Cir. 1987) (rejecting absolute immunity for social worker alleged to have ordered
father's separation from child). "[The social worker's] alleged decision to order Meyers
away from his house was made in the absence of such 'safeguards built into the judicial
process.' Id. (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978)).
212. See, e.g., 55 PA. CODE § 3130.65 (1996) (requiring that judicial approval be
sought for extensions of voluntary placement agreements longer than thirty days).
213. See, e.g., id.
214. Cf 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6332(a), 6335(a) (West Supp. 1995).
215. See, e.g, supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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6 consumer transactions, and waivers
medical treatment,'1
of government
17

benefits.

In answer to the questions raised by Croft,"8 parental separation
agreements should be available to fully informed parents during
investigations. To avoid abuse of such agreements, however, their use must
be carefully defined by legislation or regulation, and the courts must be
willing to undertake the factual inquiry necessary to respond to an issue of
misuse.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE ENFORCEMENT

In 1981, the Supreme Court in Lassiter v. Department of Social
Services" 9 held that constitutional principles of due process do not
automatically require appointment of counsel for indigent parents in
termination cases.2
Some commentators expressed surprise and dismay
over this perceived failure of the justices to recognize a critical need for
legal advice.22'
Critics anticipated that the case-by-case approach to
deciding the need for counsel would be unwieldy and that states would take
advantage of every opportunity to avoid the expense of appointed counsel,
however great the need.222
A large number of states have not given in to such efficiency
temptations because of heightened due process tests under state constitutions
and because of the subsequent action of many state legislatures that mandate
appointed counsel for indigent parents.223 The practical need to provide

216. As one article noted,
The [medical-legal] doctrine which has evolved is predicated on a recognition that a
patient has a right - sometimes this is acknowledged to be a constitutional guarantee
- to decide what happens to his or her body. The decision can be made only after a
person knows what a health care provider proposes to do, what the risks are from this
treatment, and what alternatives exist.
Richard E. Shugrue & Kathryn Linstromberg, The Practitioner's Guide to Informed Consent,
24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 881, 883 (1991) (citations omitted).
217. See supra text accompanying notes 156-67.
218. See text accompanying supra note 150.
219. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
220. Id. at 33-34.
221. See, e.g., John Leubsdorf, ConstitutionalCivil Procedure, 63 TEX. L. REv. 579,
634-35 (1984).
222. See id.; see also Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our
Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.J. 1499 (1991) (discussing the Supreme Court's characterization of
the needs of the poor).
223. E.g., In re K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276 (Alaska 1991) (holding that the denial of a
biological father's request for court-appointed counsel violated procedural due process under
the state constitution where a stepparent sought termination of his parental rights in order to
accomplish adoption); In re J.C., Jr., 781 S.W.2d 226 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the
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counsel for parents is clear. In similar fashion, after Croft, additional courts
should not have to identify the due process implications of fictional
voluntary separation decisions. States should act quickly to mandate the use
of fair, written temporary placement or separation agreements during
investigations of child abuse or neglect. The essential elements of such
written documents include:
*

a reasonable and specific maximum time period for the temporary
separation;
* notice of the parent's opportunity to explain his or her position to the
court and to revoke or terminate the temporary placement;
* notice of the right to consult with counsel and of any right to
appointment of counsel if indigent;
* a specific process by which revocation of the voluntary placement
agreement will result in an end to the separation, without such revocation
being used as adverse evidence against the parent; and
* information regarding the government's obligation to prove that any
continued state involvement is necessary, if and when the parent believes
reunification is appropriate.
Workable descriptions of such agreements already exist in some states. 24
As with the need to provide counsel in termination cases, the practical need
to provide notice of the parent's rights during the abuse and neglect
investigation is clear. Written, temporary placement or separation agreements
are straight-forward alternatives to the doubts and suspicions about

caseworker intimidation which presently flourish. As was simply and
eloquently stated by Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion in

Schneckloth:
My approach to the case is straight-forward and, to me, obviously required
by the notion of consent as a relinquishment of Fourth Amendment rights.
I am at a loss to understand why consent "cannot be taken literally to mean
a 'knowing' choice." In fact, I have difficulty in comprehending how a
knowledge of available alternatives can be treated
decision made without
2 25
as a choice at all.

statutory right to counsel in the context of termination of parental rights gives the parent the
right to effective counsel, which is judged by whether the attorney provided a meaningful
hearing); State ex rel. E.H. v. A.H., 880 P.2d II (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (holding that parent

was entitled to effective assistance of counsel under statute providing right to counsel).
224.

See, e.g., 55 PA. CODE § 3130.65 (1996).

225. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 284 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).

